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GUIDE TO THE USE OF THIS MONOGRAPH 
The purpose of this monograph is to  provide a uniform basis for design of flightworthy 
structure. I t  summarizes for -use in space vehicle development the significant experience 
and knowledge accumulated in research, development, and operational programs to 
date. It can be used to  improve consistency in design, efficiency of the design effort, 
and confidence in the structure. All monographs in this series employ the same basic 
format - three major sections preceded by a brief INTRODUCTION, Section 1, and 
complemented by a set of REFERENCES. 
The STATE OF THE ART, Section 2, reviews and assesses current design practices and 
identifies important aspects of the present state of technology. Selected references are 
cited to  supply supporting information. This section serves as a survey of the subject 
that provides background material and prepares a proper technological base for the 
DESIGN CRITERIA and RECOMMENDED PRACTICES. 
The DESIGN CRITERIA, Section 3, state what rules, guides, or limitations must be 
imposed to  ensure flightworthiness. The criteria can serve as a checklist for guiding a 
design or assessing its adequacy. 
The RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, Section 4, state how to satisfy the criteria. 
Whenever possible, the best procedure is described; when this cannot be done, 
appropriate references are suggested. These practices, in conjunction with the criteria, 
provide guidance to the formulation of requirements for vehicle design and evaluation. 
FOREWORD 
NASA experience has indicated a need for uniform criteria for the design of space 
vehicles. Accordingly, criteria are being developed in the following areas of technology: 
Environment 
Structures 
Guidance and Control 
Chemical Propulsion 
Individual components of this work will be issued as separate monographs as soon as 
they are completed. A list of all published monographs in this series can be found at 
the end of this document. 
These monographs are to  be regarded as guides to the formulation of design 
requirements and specifications by NASA Centers and project offices. 
This monograph was prepared under the cognizance of the Langley Research Center. 
The Task Manager was J. R. Hall. The author was D. H. Mitchell of TRW Systems 
Group/TRW Inc. A number of other individuals assisted in developing the material and 
reviewing the drafts. The technical adviser was R. M. Boykin, Jr., of NASA Langley 
Research Center. In particular, the significant contributions made by C. P. Berry 
and K. L. Christensen of McDonnell Douglas Corporation; J. R. Edson of The Boeing 
Company; W. J. Fitzgerald of The Aerospace Corporation; A. B. Leaman of Lockheed 
Missiles & Space Company; S. Merkowitz and C. D. Pengelley of General Dynamics 
Corporation; G .  W. Pape of North American Rockwell Corporation; and H. C. Scott of 
LTV Aerospace Corporation are hereby acknowledged. 
NASA plans to  update this monograph when need is established. Comments and 
recommended changes in the technical content are invited and should be forwarded to  
the attention of the Design Criteria Office, Langley Research Center, Hampton,Virginia 
23365. 
October 1970 
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FLIGHT SEPARATION 
MECHANISMS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Parts of a space vehicle must be separated during flight to jettison stages and 
components that are no longer needed, to uncover equipment, or to deploy payloads. 
For a mission to  be successful, the separations must occur at the correct times of flight 
and with minimum changes in the attitude and rotational rates (i.e., tip-off errors) of 
the continuing body. There must be no recontact between the separating bodies, no 
detrimental shock loads induced in the structure, and no excessive or harmful debris. A 
separation mechanism that does not meet these requirements can produce attitude 
errors and tumble rates of the continuing body that are too large for its 
attitude-control system to accommodate, can damage its structure and critical 
equipment, and can cause failure or degradation of the mission. 
Failure of separation mechanisms has adversely affected mission performance in several 
instances; for example: 
A Vanguard satellite failed to achieve orbit because the second stage of the 
launch vehicle was damaged at separation. 
On several early satellite launches, booster stages failed to separate. 
On a military mission, the final booster stage overtook and bumped the 
spacecraft after separation, damaging critical equipment in the spacecraft. 
On a recent military mission, an extendible boom was damaged at separation 
and failed to extend. 
During an Apollo launch, the pyrotechnic shock of a separation was of 
suff ic ient  magnitude to close propellant-isolation valves in the 
reaction-control system of the spacecraft. The crew was unable to maneuver 
the spacecraft until the valves could be opened. 
This monograph presents criteria and recommends practices for the design and testing 
of mechanisms for separating space-vehicle stages, payloads, and pods. The advantages 
and disadvantages of various separation techniques are presented and the characteristics 
of typical devices that have been used to effect separation are discussed. The 
mechanical and structural elements that maintain load-path continuity and accomplish 
separation are emphasized, rather than the auxiliary devices used to time, energize, 
interconnect, and monitor separation events. Separation dynamics, the effects of 
environments and operating conditions, and methods of analyzing and testing 
separation mechanisms are also discussed. The separation of fairings and payload 
aerodynamic shrouds is a complex subject and will be considered in another 
monograph in this series. 
In designing separation mechanisms, the following factors must be considered: (1) 
adequate clearance between the separating bodies; (2) shock transmission to the 
payload or structure of the continuing body; (3) damage to or contamination of the 
continuing body by debris resulting from the operation of the separation mechanism; 
and (4) the ability of the mechanism to  withstand the natural and induced 
environments encountered during service. 
The designer can choose from among a considerable number of separation components 
that have been designed, tested, and flown on space vehicles. This approach is usually 
taken to avoid the cost of new designs and tests associated with development of 
components. Separation-dynamics analyses of varying degrees of complexity are 
conducted to  assess the performance of the mechanism. Functional tests of the 
separation mechanism are conducted to  demonstrate satisfactory performance and, in 
some cases, tests are performed to show that the mechanism can operate satisfactorily 
after or during exposure to the anticipated service environments. 
This document is complemented by other monographs in this series: staging and 
separation loads, design-development testing, qualification testing, and acceptance 
testing. Other monographs on related subjects are planned, including structural 
response to  mechanical shock, mechanical shock induced by explosives, and shroud 
separation. 
2. STATE OF THE ART 
2.1 Design 
Separation mechanisms have been used since the space effort began. Until the 
mid-1 960s, many different design concepts were used (refs. 1 to 5). However, in recent 
years there has been a trend toward using a few, well-established concepts, and the 
separation-mechanism components have become more refined. Since the established 
designs are usually adequate, there has been little interest in developing new concepts. 
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New confined-explosive release techniques have been developed (refs. 6 and 7), but 
these are just beginning to come into use. If successful, the new techniques will provide 
greatly simplified separation mechanisms. 
Most of the information on separation mechanisms is contained in internal company 
documents which receive little if any general distribution; there is not much material 
on the subject in the available literature. 
2.1.1 Release Devices 
Two basic approaches have been used to design a structure that will carry loads until 
the time of separation and then break cleanly into two or more sections. The first is to 
design a continuous structure to carry the loads and then to  add a device that cuts the 
structure cleanly on command. The second is to design two separate structures that are 
attached at a prescribed mating surface until separation is initiated. The first approach 
has led to the use of explosive release devices that cut along a line, while the second has 
generally led to the use of clamps, diaphragms, and/or point-release devices such as 
explosive bolts and nuts. Each approach has been used successfully many times, and 
the choice of an approach for a particular space vehicle usually depends on the 
requirements of the mission, on the experience of the designer, and on whether 
existing hardware can be used. 
Two critical design considerations for a release device are the possible shock loading 
and the damage from debris to adjacent structure. In table I in the Appendix, various 
types of release devices are described and compared in terms of these considerations. 
Other special considerations for each device are also listed. 
The use of ordnance with most release devices introduces design constraints based on 
safety considerations during the handling and operation of the devices. Because some 
electroexplosive devices (EEDs) may be accidentally ignited by radio-frequency (RF) 
energy or electrostatic discharge, they must be designed to withstand a specified 
current or power level without ignition. The common range-safety standard is the 
power necessary for one ampere of current in the EED or one watt of applied power 
(whichever is greater) for a period of five minutes. This standard was established 
arbitrarily and was not based on a detailed analysis of typical environments. It has 
caused a great deal of controversy in recent years and should be reevaluated to 
establish a more realistic range-safety standard for RF sensitivity. 
There is no explicit range-safety standard on electrostatic discharge, even though a 
difference of potential caused by the buildup of static electricity in the body of a 
technician could ignite an EED when touched. Such incidents have at times resulted in 
casualties which have led to the adoption of special handling and installation 
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procedures, such as grounding to prevent charge buildup. In addition, some effort has 
been made to redesign EEDs to protect them from electrostatic discharge; for example, 
EEDs are protected by metal caps or shorting plugs during installation. Present 
industry standards call for EEDs to withstand 20 to 25 kilovolts from a 500-microfarad 
capacitor with 0- to 5000-ohm series resistance. 
Space-environment effects on ordnance represent a new problem introduced by the 
longer-term missions involving entry spacecraft or planetary vehicles. For 
cartridge-type ordnance, the effects of storage and of space environment are similar. 
Temperature versus time is more important than the external pressure since the 
cartridges are internally sealed. The effects of space environment on detonating cords 
and shape charges have not been completely defined; for instance, little information 
has been obtained on the effects of radiation on this type of ordnance. Outgassing or 
subliming of the explosive is possible, but it appears that temperature is still more 
important than external pressure. The current trend is to use explosives that can 
survive higher temperature and vacuum, such as HNS, when these effects are critical, 
rather than the common RDX-type materials. Long-term environment-exposure tests 
are then conducted to verify acceptable performance of the ordnance, 
V-clamp bands are excellent release devices for small-diameter vehicles because they are 
simple, they provide a field joint, and they produce a relatively clean, low-shock 
separation. They are usually designed in segments, with several V-clamps attached to 
each band and severable load-carrying devices, such as explosive bolts, connecting the 
segments. V-clamp joints can be designed to withstand the same magnitude of 
structural loads as other release devices, but may become heavier than the other devices 
when they are used with large-diameter vehicles. In addition, as the band diameter 
increases it becomes more difficult to  distribute the band-clamping force evenly around 
the clamp circumference during installation. For these reasons, V-clamp bands are 
generally not used on vehicles larger than 60 inches in diameter. Shock and 
contamination from the V-clamp devices are minimal, but a considerable amount of 
energy is stored because of preload on the bands at installation. It is often necessary to 
restrain the bands after separation to keep them from striking the continuing body. 
This is usually accomplished by the use of springs or cables on the expended stage. 
Diaphragms have been used successfully to separate the stages of several relatively 
small-diameter, solid-propellant boosters (e.g., ref. 8). The devices consist of a 
one-piece circular coupling with a central disc and integral petals extending outward 
from the central disc. A “T”-flange at the outer extremities of the petals is threaded 
and serves to connect the two stages because it is screwed into internal threads at the 
nozzle-exit plane and internal threads on the lower-stage adapter. When the upper-stage 
motor is ignited in flight, the pressure of the exhaust gases deflects the central disc 
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away from the motor's nozzle and causes the petals to  bend (and sometimes fracture) 
at the point where they join the central disc. This rotates the T-flange inward and 
disengages the threads holding the stages together. 
Diaphragms are usually designed to  operate at exhaust-gas pressures of 30 to  50 psi 
'(200 to 340 kN/m2). Diaphragms are often used for atmospheric separations so that 
fins on the continuing body (or other attitude-control devices) can be used to correct 
the errors introduced by the separation. If the vehicle is spun (for stability), the 
separation joint may be keyed to  prevent the stages from unscrewing and causing a 
premature separation. 
Point-release devices usually contain redundant ordnance with demonstrated overall 
reliability for ordnance ignition ranging from 0.999 to 0.9999. Without redundancy, 
this reliability falls t o  the 0.98 to  0.999 range. The mechanical parts of the device are 
usually not redundant and, although the mechanical parts are highly reliable, they are 
assigned a lower reliability value (0.995 is typical) than the redundant ordnance 
because sufficient test data have not been accumulated to substantiate higher 
numerical reliability values. Thus, to  obtain higher reliability for the separation 
mechanism, the mechanical parts are made redundant, as well. An example of 
mechanical redundancy is a V-clamp band that allows separation when only one 
point-release device operates. 
The most promising new concept in release devices is the confined linear explosive 
technique. With this concept, the detonation of the explosive causes a tube of metal 
(ref. 6) or elastomer (ref. 7) to expand and break the load-carrying structure without 
releasing contaminants or fragments. This offers all the advantages of quick, clean 
release, with none of the contamination associated with many line-cutting release 
devices. I t  is hoped that the shock levels of these new devices will be lower than the 
levels of existing devices. 
2.1.2 Separation-Impulse Devices 
Many techniques have been used to  provide the impulse to  give a specified relative 
momentum, and hence separation velocity, between separating bodies. However, stage 
ignition, auxiliary rockets, thrust reversal, and springs have been the most frequently 
used techniques in vehicles made thus far. These and other common separation-impulse 
devices are described in the Appendix in table 11. Some of the release mechanisms 
listed in table I (Appendix), such as the linear-shaped charge and the mild detonating 
fuze, can also provide the necessary separation velocity, although not efficiently. A 
separate device is therefore usually used to  provide the impulse necessary for 
separation. One novel, inexpensive approach is to  seal an interstage compartment at a 
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pressure of one atmosphere on the earth’s surface and then allow the trapped gas to 
expand in the vacuum of space during separation. Because the current 
separation-impulse device designs can meet a variety of requirements, there is little 
need for a significant breakthrough in the state of the art unless drastically new 
separation requirements occur. 
Stage ignition, or “fire-in-the-hole” staging, where the engine of the continuing stage is 
ignited at the time of stage separation, eliminates the need for devices to provide the 
separation impulse, but may require vent openings in the expended stage. This 
technique has been used successfully many times, but it requires detailed analysis and 
tests of gasdynamic effects on tip-off (ref. 9), of possible nozzle-choking conditions, of 
debris hazards, as well as evaluation of structure and equipment in the cavity that may 
require tie-down mechanisms. Additionally, the heat pulse reflected from the trailing 
stage may make it necessary to protect the continuing stage by adding thermal 
insulation to the rear of the continuing stage. If the stages have large overlap, such as 
an antenna or engine nozzle protruding into the trailing stage, there may also be severe 
clearance problems with this type of separation. 
Auxiliary rockets that exert either positive thrust on the continuing stage or 
retrothrust on the expended stage have been successfully used to provide the 
separation impulse for a variety of boosters. The rockets can usually be integrated in 
the vehicle with minimum interference with other vehicle systems. If the rockets are on 
the continuing stage, their thrust vectors are usually oriented to prevent unintended 
spin-up or tumbling of the stage. If the rockets are on the jettisoned stage, their thrust 
vectors are sometimes oriented to  cause tumbling and lateral movement of the stage so 
that it is removed from the vicinity of the continuing stage. Contamination of the 
continuing stage can be reduced by mounting the rockets as far from the separation 
plane as possible and by canting their thrust vectors outward. Even with this design 
approach, there may be such unacceptable contamination as to require that other 
separation-impulse devices be used. 
Thrust reversal has been used successfully to separate the stages of vehicles having 
solid-propellant motors. Thrust reversal is a simple concept in which a portion of the 
exhaust gases are directed forward through ports to overcome primary nozzle thrust. 
The reverse-thrust ports are located in the side of the rocket, usually toward the front, 
with their thrust axes inclined forward. The port closures are blown open at a 
predetermined time of flight or vehicle velocity. The ports are designed to cancel 
primary nozzle thrust or to provide a small net amount of reverse thrust to achieve a 
relative separation velocity between the separating stages. I t  is necessary that the thrust 
reversal occur in the proper sequence with stage separation, and with ignition of the 
motor of the continuing stage. The sudden opening of the ports and the ensuing reverse 
thrust create a sizable shock transient and disperse a considerable amount of 
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contamination in the form of debris and products of combustion. These effects must 
be studied in detail to ensure that the continuing stage is not damaged. 
In terms of cost and reliability, springs are ideal separation-impulse devices when there 
are stringent tip-off requirements such as payload separation. Helical compression 
springs are the most common type of springs used for separation. A single spring is 
adequate for separation when the bodies are spinning, but three or more are used for 
nonspinning separations or when the allowable tip-off errors are small. As many as 30 
springs have been used to reduce the out-of-tolerance effects of a given spring on 
tip-off rates and to lower the spring-stroke length necessary to induce the desired 
velocity change. 
Commercial springs, usually of steel, can be used if the axial stroke and the forces in 
each of the three directions are measured carefully during compression of each spring 
and those springs with similar characteristics are paired and positioned to compensate 
for differences in the strokes and forces. As described in reference 10, this matching of 
springs has provided four-spring separation mechanisms that produced tip-off rates of 
0.5 deg/sec and lower. The springs were constrained from lateral motion by spring cups 
on each body and were attached to the jettisoned body to keep them from flying €ree 
after separation. Spring cartridges have also been used with good results. When spring 
cartridges are used, it is only necessary to measure and compensate for differences in 
the axial force of the springs. When a large amount of energy is necessary to provide 
the required relative motion between bodies, a separation-impulse system using springs 
may be heavier than other systems. 
The design of separation-impulse devices is affected by residual thrust in the expended 
stage. On stages with solid-propellant motors, an unexplained phenomenon sometimes 
occurs: the solid propellant continues to burn after separation and causes a small 
amount of positive thrust in the expended stage (ref. 11). This “chuffing” or 
“chugging” can cause the expended stage to  overtake and bump the continuing stage. 
A similar problem has occurred on stages with liquid-propellant motors when there is a 
reignition, or “burp,” after the nominal shutdown of the motor. These problems have 
been overcome by igniting the motor of the continuing stage soon after separation, by 
programming a long coast time between nominal burnout and separation to allow the 
residual thrust to die out, or by moving the expended stage from the vicinity of the 
continuing stage after separation by using one of the auxiliary devices discussed in 
Section 2.1.3. The burp problem on liquid-propellant engines has also been relieved by 
changing the fuel/oxidizer mixture ratio. 
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2.1.3 Auxiliary Devices 
Some of the auxiliary devices used in conjunction with separation mechanisms are 
described in table 111 in the Appendix. These special devices assist the separation 
maneuver by guiding or changing the spin rate of the continuing stage or tumbling the 
expended stage; or the devices may sever electric or hydraulic connections between the 
two stages, or create an electric signal for use with other mechanisms. One auxiliary 
device consists of a single separation spring that provides the torque to spin up and the 
compression force to separate the continuing stage simultaneously. This has been used 
several times on small piggyback satellites and has proven to be a very inexpensive 
method of effecting both separation and spin-up. Because the auxiliary devices listed in 
table I11 (Appendix) are not essential parts of the separation mechanism itself, they 
will not be discussed in detail. 
2.2 Analysis 
A vital part of separation-mechanism development is the dynamic analysis of both the 
separation mechanism and the bodies to be separated. This may range in complexity 
from the analysis of simple, rigid-body, one-degree-of-freedom models to intricate, 
nonlinear computer simulations in which each body has six rigid-body degrees of 
freedom, may be spinning, and elastic effects are considered. Customarily, the analysis 
is used to predict the nominal performance of the mechanism and to estimate tip-off 
errors due to standard tolerances on the various design parameters. I t  has also become 
common to perform a failure-modes-and-effects analysis in which failure modes are 
assumed and their effects on the performance of the separation mechanism evaluated, 
at least in a qualitative sense. 
In general, two levels of analysis have been used successfully. In cases where no 
complex forces act on the bodies, simple planar models have been used to analyze 
nonspinning separations and simple transverse-moment models have been used to 
analyze spinning separations. The separation mechanism is designed to operate 
successfully when each parameter that affects tip-off or hang-up, such as tolerance 
effects, assumes its most adverse value (e.g., a combination of smallest moment of 
inertia, smallest axial spring rate, and largest lateral spring rate). Often, several 
iterations of the analysis are necessary to determine the worst combination of 
parametric values (equivalent, in statistical terms, to large sigma values - possibly 9 or 
10) and to confirm satisfactory separation of the bodies under this condition. 
Although the simple analysis does not account for the effects of coupling and of 
complex forces and moments, this shortcoming is conservatively compensated for by 
the requirement for satisfactory separation under the worst combination of parametric 
values. This type of analysis has proven successful for most simple separations and has 
led to the design of separation mechanisms with high intrinsic reliability. 
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When complex forces or moments act on the bodies, the mission is man rated, 
separation-mechanism weight is critical, or mission requirements are stringent, then 
complex, nonlinear computer simulations of separation are performed. In this type of 
analysis, the forces and moments acting on each body are accounted for in detail, each 
body is allowed rigid-body motion in six degrees of freedom, gyroscopic coupling is 
included for spinning cases, and elastic effects may be considered. In addition, 
statistical studies are performed to assess the effect on separation motion when the 
value of each parameter is allowed to vary throughout its tolerance band. The expense 
of conducting these studies is often reduced by using Monte Carlo techniques instead 
of by computing the separation motion for every possible combination of parametric 
values. 
Another technique for complex separation analyses is to determine the partial 
derivative of each error source. The partial derivatives, together with the range of 
values of each parameter, can be used to determine the possible tip-off error 
attributable to the variation in the value of each parameter. The tip-off errors from all 
parameters are then combined to give the total possible error. The favored technique 
for combining the errors is to add directly all the errors attributable to correlated 
parameters and to add the errors attributable to  uncorrelated parameters by the 
root-sum-square method. This technique gives a close approximation of the results that 
could be obtained with a more rigorous mathematical approach and avoids a large 
number of computer runs. 
The partial-derivative error analysis also identifies the principal sources of tip-off error 
and the parameters which should be closely controlled, and those which can be allowed 
to vary without producing excessive errors. This information is especially useful for 
cost/weight tradeoff studies. The partial-derivative approach offers the best practical 
way to analyze the separation mechanism and to evaluate possible errors. 
Depending on the time in the flight when separation is programmed to occur, a 
rigorous separation analysis considers the effects of the aerodynamic environment, 
wind shears or gusts, fuel sloshing, engine-nozzle flow separation, sequencing of events, 
control-system interactions, mass and inertia properties of the separating bodies, 
gyroscopic coupling, and details of the separation mechanism itself. Solution of the 
equations of motion that simulate separation usually requires integration by a digital, 
analog, or hybrid computer. References 10 and 12 present rigorous separation analyses 
of nonspinning and spinning exoatmospheric spacecraft separations, respectively, while 
reference 13 presents a typical analysis of separation in the atmosphere. Representative 
simulations of a man-rated mission are described in references 14 and 1 5 ; references 16 
and 17 present Monte Carlo studies. 
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Separation-dynamics studies of separations that occur in the earth’s atmosphere have 
generally been more complex than studies of those which occur in space. As an 
example, if ignition of the engine of the continuing stage occurs when the separating 
bodies are within a few vehicle diameters of each other, gas recirculation flow can 
cause complex gasdynamic interactions between the bodies. Depending on the dynamic 
pressure at the time of separation, the body geometry, the engine-exhaust gas flow, and 
the venting geometry, the gasdynamic interactions can cause tip-off errors and angular 
rates in the thrusting body that can in turn cause the separating bodies to collide. To 
prevent collision, the separating bodies are sometimes mechanically guided for the first 
few feet of axial motion. In addition to  the danger of collision, unexpectedly high 
structural loads and heating may occur in the area of the separation mechanism, and 
the recirculation and engine-exhaust gas flows can impart unexpected velocity to the 
separating bodies, thus changing their expected trajectories. Such complex atmospheric 
separation problems, their analyses, and methods of testing the separation-mechanism 
design in detail are discussed in references 18 to  22. 
Even when there is no immediate ignition of the engine of the continuing stage (as in 
the separation of an unpowered payload stage from the last booster stage, or when a 
programmed coast period follows the separation of stages), collision can occur after 
separation in the atmosphere because of the flow field (aerodynamic wake) behind the 
continuing body. The characteristics of this wake depend on the altitude, forebody 
shape, Mach number, and the relative axial and lateral positions of the two bodies. 
Separation mechanisms for use in the atmosphere have often included auxiliary devices 
such as extra drag flaps, tumble motors for nonspinning separations, single-yo tumble 
systems for spinning separations, or staggered-fire retros to alter the trajectory of the 
expended stage and get it out of the wake and vicinity of the continuing body. This 
problem and analytical techniques for evaluating such auxiliary devices are discussed in 
reference 23. 
Separations that occur outside the atmosphere are usually easier to analyze because the 
nonlinear aerodynamic forces are not significant. A rigorous analysis of these 
separations, however, must consider the effects of attitude-control-system forces and 
torques, partial failure of separation-mechanism ordnance, sequencing of events, 
nozzle-flow separation, fuel sloshing, mass and inertia properties of the two bodies, and 
details of the separation mechanism itself. 
2.3 Tests 
Tests are usually conducted to demonstrate that the separation mechanism will operate 
properly under service conditions. Several varieties of tests are performed, and these 
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are identified and briefly described in table IV in the Appendix. Development tests 
may be conducted if the separation mechanism is a new design, if it uses new 
components, or if the environmental conditions or performance requirements are 
expected to be more severe than those previously encountered. Development tests may 
range in complexity from environmental-exposure tests of components to  sophisticated 
functional-demonstration tests of full-size separation mechanisms, depending on the 
degree of confidence in analytical methods and the similarity to or success of previous 
separation-mechanism designs. 
Components of the separation mechanism usually undergo the same type of 
qualification and acceptance tests as other components of the vehicle. Qualification 
tests verify that design requirements have been achieved; acceptance tests check for 
workmanship flaws on flight hardware. Ordnance in particular must be given extensive 
lot qualification and surveillance testing (ref. 24) to demonstrate satisfactory ignition 
and mechanical characteristics. Qualification tests are generally performed on ordnance 
devices separately from the qualification tests of the overall separation mechanism. 
Ground testing of full-size hardware for separation of large-body vehicles in 
atmospheric-flight environments is quite difficult; therefore, wind-tunnel tests of scale 
models are often performed and the test results are used in conjunction with the results 
of flight tests of the full-sized vehicle. Part of the separation event is simulated in each 
phase of the testing (ref. 20) and the data from all phases are correlated to permit a 
judgment of the adequacy of the separation system’s performance, Correlation of the 
data is difficult in many instances because not all of the parameters scale in the same 
manner, and ambient conditions cannot be controlled precisely during flight tests. 
Therefore, the wind-tunnel tests sometimes have to be repeated with more refined 
input data. 
The difficulty of ground testing mechanisms for exoatmospheric separation lies in the 
proper simulation of vacuum and zero-gravity conditions. Vacuum chambers are 
generally used, and if they are large enough, separation drop tests can be conducted 
inside the chamber to simulate both effects. When chambers are not available or when 
the specimen is too large to be drop-tested in a chamber, zero-gravity conditions are 
simulated by supporting the test specimen along a noncritical axis (pendulum 
suspension or horizontal testing on a friction-free surface) or by drop tests in the 
atmosphere. If these test methods are not feasible, gravity effects on the test data are 
often corrected by analytical means. When drop tests are performed in the atmosphere, 
aerodynamic effects are kept small by conducting tests indoors or in shielded areas 
whenever possible, by keeping velocities low, and by adding streamlining shields. 
Problems in supporting the test specimen arise in simulating separation of spinning 
stages. Because bearings will introduce improper lateral moments, these separations are 
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usually simulated by free-flight tests: either drop tests or free-rise tests. In the free-rise 
tests, the specimen is accelerated upward before separation occurs and the separated 
bodies are captured when they stop rising, thereby reducing the possibility of damage 
to the specimen from the catching mechanism. Other problems arise in testing 
separation systems for spinning bodies, especially if spinning-falling body data must be 
recorded. Considerable care is taken in developing the test procedures and the means of 
recording the test data. Danger from flying parts during the test is avoided by enclosing 
the test fixture in a protective shield or, if this is not possible, by removing personnel 
and equipment from the test area. 
Spinning-body tests also pose problems of recording test data accurately. Perturbations 
to spinning-body separations result in coning of the spinning body. The magnitude of 
coning depends on the spin rate and mass moment of inertia of the spinning body and 
on the manner in which small impulses or unbalanced forces are applied to it. The cone 
half angle is usually small, and the test instrumentation must be accurate enough so 
that the contribution of various error sources to the total error can be identified. If the 
instrumentation error is sufficient to prevent accurate measurement of the test data, 
then optical systems, calibrated grids, and high-speed motion-picture cameras are used 
to magnify and record the test data. A separation test and optical recording system are 
described in reference 25. 
I t  is difficult to record shock data in tests of some separation mechanisms. Separation 
mechanisms that include EEDs generate complex shock and, in some cases, significant 
contamination and fragmentation when separation occurs. (Data from actual flights are 
contained in ref. 26.) Recording the shock during tests of these mechanisms often 
presents special problems, such as when the frequency of the data causes saturation of 
the recording instruments and when shock levels exceed the range of the instrument 
calibration. Other problems occur in mounting the accelerometers used to record the 
test data. Incorrect shock-measurement data are also obtained when the natural 
frequency of the recording instrument is within the frequency range encountered in 
the test, or when the zero point on the recording scale shifts during the test. The 
problems associated with measuring separation-mechanism shocks are discussed in 
detail in references 27 and 28. 
3. CRITERIA 
Space-vehicle separation mechanisms shall maintain structural continuity under ground 
and flight loads, physically separate the structural segments on command, and impart 
necessary relative motion between the separating segments without producing forces, 
motions, stresses, or debris that impair the stability, structural integrity, or mission of 
the continuing segment(s). The feasibility of new separation concepts shall be 
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demonstrated by appropriate development tests. The structural and functional 
adequacy of the separation mechanism under the anticipated environments and service 
conditions shall be demonstrated by both analysis and test. 
3.1 Design 
Separation mechanisms shall be designed to withstand limit structural loads without 
excessive deformation and to  withstand ultimate structural loads without failure. 
Separation mechanisms shall also be designed to  separate structural segments only on 
command, without recontact of the segments, and without causing damage or 
contamination, and without imparting excessive attitude errors to  the continuing 
segment. Separation mechanisms shall be designed for reliability of performance 
commensurate with the specified overall system reliability of the vehicle. 
At least the following factors shall be accounted for in the design of separation 
mechanisms: 
0 Natural and induced environments to  which the mechanism will be exposed 
Stiffness and dynamic characteristics of the separating bodies 0 
Physical and functional interfaces between the separating bodies 
Physical and functional interfaces between the separation mechanism and 
other vehicle systems 
0 Mass properties of the separating bodies 
Applicable range-safety standards and requirements. 0 
3.2 Analysis 
Analysis and/or test data from similar mechanisms and components shall be used to  
verify that the following separation-mechanism performance requirements are met 
under the anticipated operating conditions: 
0 Adequate structural continuity before separation 
Adequate clearance between the separating segments 
0 Adequate relative separation velocity 
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0 Allowable tip-off errors resulting from separation 
0 Functional ability in a partial failure mode. 
Mathematical models of the separation mechanism and the separating bodies shall be 
sufficient to simulate accurately all significant motions of the separating bodies. The 
analysis shall account for all significant disturbances that affect separation, such as ( 1) 
improper sequencing; (2) vibration; (3) drag from service lines; (4) contamination; ( 5 )  
control-system response; (6) improper firing of ordnance; (7)  restrained movement 
(binding); (8) engine-plume impingement; (9) aerodynamic heating; (1 0) degradation 
from long-term orbit life; (1 1) structural relaxation; and (1 2) rocket-thrust 
misalignments. 
3.3 Tests 
Sufficient tests of separation mechanisms shall be conducted to establish the feasibility 
of new component or separation-mechanism concepts, to  demonstrate satisfactory 
performance of separation mechanisms or components, and to ensure that flight 
articles conform to specifications. 
3.3.1 Development Tests 
The feasibility of new concepts for components or separation mechanisms or 
techniques shall be established by appropriate development tests. For atmospheric 
separation, the aerodynamic characteristics of the separating bodies shall be 
determined by appropriate wind-tunnel development tests. 
3.3.2 Qualification Tests 
Satisfactory performance of separation mechanisms following exposure to the 
anticipated service environments shall be demonstrated by appropriate qualification 
tests. Dimensional compatibility of the separation mechanism with the separating 
bodies shall be demonstrated by an appropriate fit-check test. 
3.3.2.1 Environmental Tests 
Environmental qualification tests shall be conducted to demonstrate the ability of the 
separation mechanism to operate satisfactorily after exposure to  at least the following 
worst-case conditions: 
0 Static loads 
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0 Random and/or sinusoidal vibration 
0 Shock 
0 Acoustic noise 
Temperature 
0 Vacuum 
0 Pressure 
0 Humidity. 
These conditions shall be applied in realistic sequence and combinations while the 
separation mechanism is inoperative unless special considerations require that they be 
applied during a functional demonstration test. 
3.3.2.2 Functional Tests 
A functional test shall be conducted on separation mechanisms unless performance 
data from similar devices used in the same type of application and in similar 
environments indicate the adequacy of the design. If a full-scale test of the separation 
mechanism is not conducted, the release device shall be demonstrated to function 
under simulated operating conditions. The full-scale functional separation test shall 
demonstrate: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Satisfactory clearance between the separating structures 
Acceptable relative separation velocity 
Allowable tip-off errors 
Lack of physical damage to  the separating bodies, components, and 
equipment resulting from separation 
Allowable shock levels 
Lack of, or allowable, contamination 
Adequate functioning of the mechanism in a partial-failure mode where 
redundancy is included. 
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When the anticipated service environment is different from the ambient conditions of 
the test area, the effects of service temperatures, pressures, or aerodynamic conditions 
shall be appropriately accounted for in the various tests. If critical, the separation 
mechanism shall be preconditioned prior to functional testing to account for vibration, 
shock, and thermal effects encountered before operation. 
3.3.2.3 Ordnance 
The no-fire and all-fire characteristics of all ordnance devices used in separation 
mechanisms shall be demonstrated by test. At least the reliability of ignition of all 
ordnance devices used in separation mechanisms shall be demonstrated by test. 
3.3.3 Acceptance Tests 
Compliance of flight-separation mechanisms with established system specifications 
shall be demonstrated by appropriate acceptance tests. 
4. RECOMMENDED PRACTICES 
Development of a separation mechanism involves the efforts of many engineering 
specialists, such as mission planners, trajectory analysts, guidance and control analysts, 
separation dynamicists, structural analysts, vibration analysts, and ordnance experts. 
The separation-mechanism designer must carefully integrate information and data from 
these specialists to design an effective separation mechanism. Close coordination 
between the various specialists is essential during all phases of design and testing of the 
separation mechanism. 
4.1 Design 
The best way to select a separation mechanism is to choose qualified flight-proven 
hardware such as the Apollo Standard Initiators, wherever practical, even at the 
expense of a slight weight increase. At the same time, however, the designer must be 
sure that the environments to which a flight-proven component has been qualified are 
at least as severe as those expected for the mission planned. The designer should recall 
that a “flight-proven” component is not necessarily made to operate under all possible 
flight conditions. 
If it is impractical to use proven hardware for the separation mechanism, several 
different designs should be developed in some detail before the final choice is made. 
Factors that should be considered in the final selection include reliability, cost, 
complexity, system weight, jettisonable weight, and compatibility with other parts of 
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the system. Tradeoff studies should be documented so they can be used in future 
designs. 
Separation-mechanism reliability is usually ensured by prudent mechanical-design 
practices. Although the application of standard reliability statistics to  mechanical 
systems is often inappropriate, redundancy can be used to  increase the numerical value. 
Mechanical redundancy is especially important because the numerical reliability 
assigned to  the mechanical elements of separation mechanisms is usually lower than 
that of other separation-system elements, such as explosive devices. Mechanical 
redundancy should be used wherever practical; mechanical reliability can be 
determined by using data and techniques described in reference 29. If explosive 
ordnance is used in the separation mechanism, redundant initiation of the explosive is 
recommended. In addition, the initiators should receive redundant initiation signals. 
Methods of evaluating the reliability and safety of explosive-ordnance systems are given 
in reference 30. 
The constraints on specific separation-mechanism devices presented in tables I, 11, and 
111 in the Appendix should be considered in selecting an appropriate device for a 
particular vehicle. The general constraints on hardware selection are the amount of 
space and weight available for the separation mechanism, the required relative 
separation velocity, the maximum allowable tip-off errors, sensitivity to shock of 
equipment near the mechanism, and the loads to  be carried before separation. 
Generally, no structure or component should extend across the separation joint unless 
necessary; guides such as rails, rollers, and sway braces should be avoided wherever 
possible to avoid friction and binding; the mechanism should be designed to maintain 
as much clearance between the bodies as possible to provide for unforeseen 
malfunctions and dimensional growth. 
4.1.1 Release Devices 
There is no clear-cut advantage to  either the linear-shaped charge (LSC) or the mild 
detonating fuze (MDF); the selection of one or the other depends on the details of the 
requirements of each separation joint. Both devices should be considered in some detail 
in a tradeoff study before making the final selection. The new noncontaminating 
release devices should also be considered (refs. 6 and 7). 
If the LSC is used for skin cutting, only one LSC should be used for each severing 
location; however, the charge should contain more explosive loading than is actually 
required to  sever the structure. Usually, the next larger standard size LSC than that 
required for marginal severance of the structure should be selected. Because blast, 
contamination, and fragmentation are quite severe when the LSC is used (and increase 
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as explosive loading increases), care must be exercised to  avoid excessive overdesign of 
the LSC-explosive loading. There is some indication, however, that shock is 
independent of explosive loading if the charge is sufficient to sever the structure (ref. 
27). Blast shielding may be required, and shock mounting of such critical components 
as electrical relays should be considered. The LSC must be handled carefully (not bent 
or kinked) because the cross-section shape of the charge is critical to  its proper 
operation. A change in the shape may cause a cutting failure. A supporting holder is 
necessary to maintain the proper distance between the LSC and the structure to be cut. 
This distance should be determined by development tests. For increased reliability, the 
LSC should be ignited by dual initiators. 
The MDF makes use of an explosive charge to fracture a notched joint, rather than to 
cut through unnotched structural skin, as does the LSC. The MDF’s orientation with 
respect to the notched joint and its cross-sectional shape are not as critical as they are 
with the LSC, so there are fewer problems in handling the MDF before installation. 
However, fragmentation may be greater than with the LSC, and an estimate of the size 
and velocity of fragments should be made by suitable analysis or test. If these fragment 
characteristics are such that damage to  the continuing stage appears likely from 
operation of the release device, then shields should be considered to protect the vehicle 
from the fragments. For increased reliability, dual systems should be used to ignite the 
MDF. 
All ordnance devices used in separation mechanisms must comply with range-safety 
requirements. I t  is recommended that the same care as with any other explosive be 
taken in handling ordnance devices in the field. The RF environment to which each 
initiating element will be exposed should be evaluated and the separation mechanism 
designed and tested to withstand the environment without activation of the initiators. 
For extremely severe environments, RF  filters and/or shielding should be used to 
protect the initiators. 
Ordnance devices exposed to  long-term, hard-vacuum conditions before operation 
should be examined in more detail than devices exposed to  more ordinary conditions. 
Satisfactory performance should be verified by life tests of the devices under 
thermal-vacuum conditions. The effects of exposure to radiation should also be 
evaluated. 
Every effort should be made to  select a proven design for a point-release device from 
among those shown in table I (Appendix) because of the cost and time required to 
qualify a new design. The recommended type of point-release device is the 
nonfragmenting explosive-nut assembly, which operates without producing gas and 
fragments that may damage other parts of the vehicle. 
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For maximum reliability, separation mechanisms using mechanical-explosive 
point-release devices, such as explosive bolts or nuts, should be designed to contain as 
few components as possible. In addition, the mechanism should operate, although with 
degraded performance, even if one or more of the release devices fails. If a 
release-device failure occurs, it is better to  have large tip-off errors that can be partially 
or entirely corrected by the attitude-control system of the continuing body than for 
the bodies to remain attached. 
Ideally, all pieces of the separation mechanism should be restrained or captured after 
separation. This reduces the amount of space debris that might collide with other 
satellites or that requires tracking. This cannot always be done, however. 
V-clamp bands should be designed so that separaticn can occur with allowable tip-off 
errors if only one of the severable connections operates. The bands should be 
restrained after separation so that they do not fly off or flap loosely and strike the 
continuing stage. 
4.1.2 Separation-Impulse Devices 
There is no single preferred separation-impulse device for booster stages where the 
continuing stage is powered by rocket. Any of three common techniques - fire in the 
hole, auxiliary rockets, or thrust reversal - is recommended, depending upon the 
requirements of the mission, the available hardware, and the designer’s experience. The 
problems discussed in Section 2 and presented in table I1 (Appendix) should be 
considered, however, before a final selection is made. 
Springs are recommended as the simplest, least expensive payload-separation-impulse 
device. For simple spinning separations, one spring may be adequate; for nonspinning 
or critical spinning separations, a set of three or more springs, matched by the 
techniques discussed in reference 10, is recommended. Spring guides should be avoided 
unless absolutely required to ensure lateral stability of the springs because they 
increase the likelihood of binding or friction. The total force in the compressed springs 
should be less than the weight of the payload, This simplifies mating of the stages and 
prevents separation on the launch stand if the release device is accidentally activated. 
4.1.3 Auxiliary Devices 
The auxiliary devices used in conjunction with separation mechanisms vary widely in 
purpose and design (table 111, Appendix), depending on the characteristics of a 
particular vehicle. Accordingly, few generally applicable recommendations can be made 
for their design. 
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Auxiliary devices should be designed so they can guide bodies, sever electrical 
connections, provide “turn-on” signals for the continuing stage, and perform other 
functions without interfering with the basic function of the separation mechanism, 
which is that of parting the bodies and providing the necessary relative motion between 
them. Actually, however, the design of auxiliary devices is more strongly influenced by 
the vehicle’s characteristics than by the need to avoid undesirable effects on the 
separation maneuver. For example, the design of a yo-tumble system is more strongly 
influenced by the mass properties of the body to be tumbled (Le., the expended stage) 
and the allowable length and weight of the yo-system cable than by the requirement of 
preventing a collision of the yo weight with the continuing stage. 
It is recommended that auxiliary devices for separation mechanisms be designed to 
impart as little separation impulse or retarding force to the continuing body as 
possible. It is also recommended that the use of guide rails or rollers be minimized or 
avoided whenever possible. The risk of binding or hangup of the stages outweighs the 
advantage of a known separation path. 
4.2 Analysis 
To aid in the selection and design of the separation mechanism, mathematical 
simulation of the separation dynamics is essential. Information on critical design 
problems can usually be obtained only from a mathematical study of the separation 
event. Clearances, relative separation-velocity requirements, collision avoidance, tip-off 
errors, all.owable perturbations, and automatic controls response due to separation are 
t h e  t y p e s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  desired from these design-support studies. 
Failure-modes-and-effects studies should also be performed where appropriate. 
At least a simple, rigid-body separation analysis should be performed on all separation 
mechanisms. The analysis can be planar for nonspinning separations, but simple 
spinning-body effects should be included if separation is to occur during spin. 
If complex forces or moments occur, or if the overall system is man rated, then 
complex computer simulations of the separation event are recommended. Each body 
should have six rigid-body degrees of freedom, all important forces and moments 
should be included, the sequencing of events should be simulated, and any significant 
elastic effects should be included. 
The partial-derivative technique is recommended for determining the magnitude of 
errors resulting from the various disturbances and variations in dimensions and mass 
properties of the separating bodies and separation mechanism. The errors from all 
sources should be combined in a statistical manner (those from correlated sources 
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added directly and those from uncorrelated sources added by the root-sum-square 
process). 
When additional analysis is warranted to  reduce hardware weight, or is required for 
man-rated systems, then detailed simulation of the separation event should be 
performed. Care must be taken to ensure that all critical parameters and their 
variations are examined during such a study. 
4.3 Tests 
Development tests should be performed to  generate data for detailed separation 
analyses and to resolve any uncertainties of the separation mechanism’s preliminary 
design. Qualification testing, at both the complete mechanism and the component 
levels, should be conducted to demonstrate that the performance of the separation 
mechanism complies with design objectives. Full-scale functional tests should be 
performed on separation mechanisms of new design, but these tests can be waived if 
the design is sufficiently similar to one previously used. Satisfactory performance of 
the release device must, however, be demonstrated on each new design. 
A fit check of mating stages of the vehicle should be performed as early in the design as 
possible. This is especially important if each stage is designed by a different 
organization. All flight hardware in the area of the interface should be mounted in the 
planned location and position on each stage and a simple test made to  ensure proper fit 
and adequate clearance when the stages are joined. 
Whenever possible, environmental tests should be performed in the same sequence as 
the environments are imposed on the separation mechanism during its service life. 
Functional ground and flight tests of separation mechanisms should be performed to 
demonstrate adequate system reliability, collision avoidance, satisfactory relative 
separation velocity, allowable shock and contamination, lack of damage, and proper 
operation and sequencing. Ground tests are preferable because data acquisition is 
easier, cost is usually lower, and test conditions can be more accurately controlled than 
in flight tests. To compensate for the effects of gravity during ground tests of 
separation mechanisms, the separating bodies should be suspended from long cables 
attached at the center of gravity of each body (ref. 10). Air bearings can be used to  
perform the same function. Spinning separations should be simulated by drop tests of 
the separating bodies into a net (refs. 25 and 31) or by free-rise tests with the bodies 
captured near the top of their rise. 
When functional ground tests are performed under ambient conditions, care should be 
exercised in extrapolating the test results to actual operating conditions because 
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different conditions can produce different results. There have been numerous instances 
where test results were extrapolated to make design decisions, but these extrapolations 
were later proved to be invalid. Whenever possible, test data should be obtained that 
include the design points so that the results can be interpolated rather than 
extrapolated. 
Test data should be recorded and documented to  show that the separation mechanism 
complies with design requirements, for analysis of possible test failures of the 
mechanism, or to use in developing mechanism designs. Test data should be of the 
following types: (1) high-speed motion pictures of the functional separation test and 
other tests, as applicable; (2) oscillograph and/or magnetic-tape recording of data from 
the shock and vibration tests; (3) still photographs of test equipment and components; 
(4) rate-gyro and accelerometer telemetry data from flight or ground tests; and (5) 
reports describing the test specimen, test equipment, and the results. 
High-speed motion pictures provide the best record of possible fragmentation and of 
clearance between the separating bodies, but rate gyros and accelerometers provide the 
best data on tip-off errors and relative velocities. Magnetic tape is recommended as the 
best means of recording test data because a computer can be used to analyze the data 
and to  modify it electronically (i.e., filter it for frequencies of interest) when desired. 
Special care should be taken in shock tests to' make sure that the instrumentation and 
recording equipment are properly set for the shock levels and frequencies that are 
anticipated. A preliminary dry-run test of the ordnance alone is recommended 
wherever possible to  check out the instrumentation and recording equipment. 
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Type 
of 
device 
Linear- 
shaped 
charge 
( L W  
(ref. 3) 
Mild 
detona- 
ting 
fuze 
(MDF) 
(ref. 3) 
V-clamp 
bands 
with 
point- 
release 
devices 
(refs. 3,  
10) 
Diaphragm 
(ref. 8) 
Description 
Column of explosive 
encased in a contin- 
uous metal sheath; 
explosive energy 
focused along a line 
by shape of the 
sheath cuts struc- 
ture 
Metal-clad detona- 
ting cord threaded 
into a slot on struc- 
ture; explosion r u p  
tures notched struc- 
ture 
Clamp (usually seg- 
mented) which fits 
over mated flanges 
on two bodies; held 
in place by tension 
bands until released 
Diaphragm coupler 
between stages is 
deflected by engine 
exhaust of contin- 
uing stage or small 
auxiliary motor; this 
r ele ase s engaging 
threads on petals 
APPENDIX 
Tables Cited in the Text 
TABLE I. - RELEASE DEVICES 
Main load 
path before 
separation 
Con t inuous  
structure 
N o t c h e d  
structure 
T h r o u g h  
c l a m p  a t  
joint 
Through dia- 
phragm cou- 
pler at joint 
Shock 
loading 
Extremely 
high 
High 
Moderate; de- 
p e n d s  o n  
ban  d-r elease 
m e c h a n i s m  
a n d  o n  
amoun t  of 
preload in 
bands 
Low 
Fragmentation 
and 
contamination 
Very significant 
Very significant, 
but can be con- 
tained 
None if bands 
are restrained by 
springs (point- 
release device 
may create prob- 
lem) 
Low 
Special 
considerations 
Also can provide sepa- 
ration impulse, but in- 
efficient; simple and 
reliable; shock loading 
depends on thickness 
and type of material 
to be cut (ref. 27); 
distance between LSC 
and structure is criti- 
cal 
Omnidirectional; also 
can provide separa- 
tion impulse (depends 
on method of mount- 
ing), but inefficient; 
spreads explosive 
energy more than 
LSC, decreases shock 
loading but increases 
fragmentation unless 
internal shields or 
containment devices 
are included; can be 
made more reliable 
than LSC 
Requires point-release 
device (usually ord- 
nance); hard to mea- 
sure or predict pre- 
load; very reliable; 
design problems in- 
clude segmented joint 
rigidity, alignment, 
seating during assem- 
bly, angle of “V,” and 
preload to prevent 
gapping 
Thread shapes and 
diaphragm slots must 
be designed to trans- 
mit loads but also to 
deflect and disengage 
properly; diaphragm 
must deflect at pres- 
sure below that which 
will damage or de- 
grade engine 
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TABLE I. - RELEASE DEVICES - Concluded 
Type 
of 
device Description 
Main load 
path before 
separation 
Fragmentation 
and 
contamination 
Shock 
loading 
Special 
considerations 
Fragment- 
ing 
explosive 
bolts, nuts 
(ref. 3) 
Notched bolt or nut 
with internal explo- 
sive charge 
Through bolt Moderate High Can also be used to 
release V-clamp band; 
reliability increased 
by parallel initiation 
o r  d o u b l e - e n d e d  
bolts; shear applica- 
tions require enough 
axial force to eject 
parts from hole; may 
require capture 
All gas and fragments 
contained by nut 
assembly; high reli- 
ability with redundant 
EED; may require 
capture 
Nonfrag- 
menting 
Explosive 
nut 
assembly 
Sealed explosive 
mechanism frees 
bolt followed by 
piston impact which 
ejects bolt 
Through bolt Low None 
Impact- 
failure 
bolts 
(ref. 1) 
Type of explosive 
b o l t ;  consists of 
sealed necked-down 
bolt with internal 
explosive charge 
which drives a pis- 
ton; impact causes 
tension or shear fail- 
ure in necked-down 
section 
Through bolt Low None Reliability increased 
by parallel initiation 
system; can be loaded 
only in tension or 
shear; may require 
capture 
Pin 
pullers 
or pushers 
(gas or 
spring 
actuated) 
(ref. 1) 
Pin holds bolt stud 
or connecting link; 
gas pressure induced 
by firing squib in 
sealed unit pushes 
or pulls pin from its 
hole in stud or con- 
nection 
Through bolt 
and pin 
Low None or small Reliability increased 
by parallel initiation 
system; design prob- 
lems include align- 
ment and matching of 
force, displacement 
and time characteris- 
tics of pin units, and 
lateral loads 
Friction and binding 
must be minimized; 
may include pin pull- 
er to prevent pre- 
ma tu re  separation; 
restricts maneuvering 
before separation 
Soft 
joint 
Stages free and held 
together by inertia 
forces until drag on 
expended stage or 
ignition of contin- 
uing stage causes 
separation 
T h r o u g h  
joint (small 
overlap) 
None None 
Ball- 
lock 
pins 
Ball-headed bolt 
held by lock on ex- 
pended stage; gas- 
operated pistons re- 
lease locks for  
separation 
Through ball 
lock 
Low None Design problems are 
alignment, friction, 
binding, and tip-off; 
reliability increased 
with multiple gas 
generators manifolded 
to each unit 
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TABLE 11. - SEPARATION-IMPULSE DEVICES 
Typical 
separation- 
velocity 
range 
5 to 10 ft/sec 
(1.5 to 3 m/sec) 
Type 
of 
device 
Special 
considerations Description Complexity Weight 
Stage 
ignition 
(“fire 
in the 
hole”) 
(refs. 1, 
9) 
C o n  tinuing-stage 
motors fired upon 
disconnection of 
stages; exhaust-gas 
pressure creates  
separation force as 
well as acceleration 
of continuing stage 
In t e r s  tage venting 
areas (blast doors) 
must be adequate to 
prevent overload and 
choking of motors; 
wind-tunnel tests re- 
quired to establish de- 
sign pressure environ- 
ments; blast doors 
may not be necessary 
for higher separation 
velocities 
Moderate to 
high (detailed 
analyses and 
tests required) 
Low 
Auxiliary 
rockets 
(ref. 1) 
Cold-gas, hot-gas, or 
s o l i d - p r  opel lant  
rockets, fired to 
provide axial and/or 
la t era1 separation 
forces, can be locat- 
ed on continuing or 
jettisoned stage 
Simple, ex- 
cept for criti- 
cal alignment 
if attached to 
c o n t i n u i n g  
stage 
Moderate 10 to 20 ft/sec 
(3  to 6 m/sec) 
Thrust must be align- 
ed to principal axes if 
attached to contin- 
uing stage; situations 
where all rockets do 
not operate must be 
examined;  exhaust 
gases may affect area 
surrounding rocket on 
vehicle 
Gas-exhaust plumes 
can heat, move, con- 
taminate, or cause 
local loads in contin- 
uing stage; design 
mus t  prevent col- 
lisions with fall-away 
articles such as port 
covers 
Thrust 
reversal 
P r e s s  u re-venting 
device on front of 
s o  1 i d - p  r opel lant  
rocket motor revers- 
es thrust of expend- 
ed stage on signal; 
exhaust gases also 
impart some separa- 
tion impulse to con- 
tinuing stage 
High (extra 
parts and de- 
tailed analy- 
ses and tests 
required) 
Moderate 1 to 2 ft/sec (0.3 
to 0.6 m/sec) 
Springs 
(refs. 10, 
12) 
Single or multiple 
he l i ca l  o r  leaf 
springs force bodies 
apart upon release 
Simple Moderate 0.2 to 6 ft/sec 
(0.06 t o  1.8 
m/sec) 
Matching of springs 
can compensate for 
spring strokes and 
forces which could 
cause tip-off; lateral 
stability provided by 
design of spring or by 
guides; single spring 
can also be torqued to 
provide spinup of 
continuing stage; cali- 
brated spring car- 
tridge assemblies can 
be used for very criti- 
cal separation require- 
ments 
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Type 
of 
device 
Pis ton is forced 
against continuing 
stage by gas pressure 
generated in cylin- 
Aerody- 
namic 
effects 
Gas- 
operated 
pistons 
Moderate to 
high 
Bellows 
(ref. 1) 
TABLE 11. - SEPARATION-IMPULSE DEVICES - Concluded 
Lift and/or drag de- 
vices remove the ex- 
pended body from 
the continuing stage 
Simple but 
requires de- 
tailed analy- 
ses and tests 
Stages separated as 
bellows expand;  
may be preloaded in 
compressed position 
or activated at time 
of separation 
Moderate 
Weight 
Low if no ex- 
t r a  surfaces 
required 
Moderate to 
high 
Moderate 
Typical 
separation- 
velocity 
range 
0.5 to 1 ft/sec 
(0.15 t o  0.3 
m/sec) 
5 to 10 ft/sec 
(1.5 to 3 m/sec) 
5 to 10 ft/sec 
(1.5 to 3 m/sec) 
Special 
considerations 
D e t a i l e d  staging 
analyses must be per- 
formed and results 
verified by  wind 
tunnel tests; separa- 
tion may be difficult 
to simulate by test 
Also provides release; 
reliability increased 
by parallel initiation 
systems; design prob- 
lems include align- 
ment and matching of 
pis ton force- t ime 
characteristics 
Also provides release; 
design problems in- 
c l u d e  al ignment ,  
matching of force- 
time characteristics, 
and sealing of pre- 
loaded bellows 
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I Electrical 
Tumble 
rockets t- (ref. 3) 
TABLE III. - AUXILIARY DEVICES 
Function 
Guide two bodies until all 
or part of separation is 
achieved 
~ 
Guide expended stage 
away from continuing 
stage 
Sever electrical and fluid 
connections between stages 
~ 
Indicate successful separa- 
tion, “turn-on” next stage, 
and/or initiate next event 
Causes spinning expended 
stage to tumble and move 
away from continuing 
stage after separation 
Causes expended stage to 
tumble away from contin- 
uing stage after separation 
Changes the spin rate of 
t he  cont inuing body; 
(spin-up for injection or 
in-orbit stability; despin 
for active attitude control) 
Description 
Rails or track and rollers 
which allow bodies tc separate 
axially while lateral motion is 
controlled 
Mechanical linkages that move 
attached body to the side into 
the air stream 
Guillotine-type cutters or 
male-female connectors that 
are pulled apart by stages or 
have own release springs 
Microswitches installed be- 
tween b odies ; separation 
allows them to be activated 
Weight on cable, located off 
the CG of expended stage, 
unwraps from spinning body, 
and causes it to despin, cone, 
and tumble due to unbalanced 
forces 
Small rockets located off the 
CG of expended stage give the 
stage a lateral velocity and 
cause it to tumble 
Uses small rocket motors, cold 
or hot gases, or the separation 
spring itself to give an angular 
impulse to the continuing 
stage; yo-yo system can also 
be used for despin (ref. 3) 
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Design 
considerations 
Binding, friction, and structural 
relaxation loads at separation 
must be avoided or minimized 
Binding and friction must be 
avoided or eliminated; complex 
separation analysis 
Release or hangup forces of 
disconnect devices should be 
small compared to those of 
separation impulse device; if 
not, separation force must be 
increased; electrical circuits 
must be de-energized to prevent 
short circuits when they are cut 
by guillotine 
Forces must be very small; usu- 
ally installed in pairs to increase 
reliability 
Release must be delayed until 
continuing stage has separated 
sufficiently; correct weight and 
cable length 
Ignition of tumble rockets must 
be delayed until the continuing 
stage has separated sufficiently; 
can be used on a spinning, ex- 
pended stage 
Maneuver can be performed be- 
fore, during, or after separation; 
expelled gases should not im- 
pinge on solar cells or other 
cr i t ic  a1 hardware ; resultant 
torque must be aligned to 
body’s principal axes to prevent 
coning 
APPEND I X 
TABLE IV. - SEPARATION-MECHANISM TESTING 
Type 
of 
test 
Development 
Qualification- 
environmental 
Qualification- 
functional 
Qualification- 
ordnance 
Acceptance- 
environmental 
Acceptance- 
ordnance 
Purpose 
To determine feasibility of new devices or 
techniques 
To verify resistance to design environments 
under worst-case service conditions 
To verify design adequacy of entire mecha- 
nism 
To establish satisfactory performance 
characteristics and reliability of ordnance 
device( s) 
~ 
To verify satisfactory manufacturing work. 
manship of each flight mechanism 
To verify that a particular lot of flight items 
is built to specification 
Description 
Can be as extensive or simple as necessary, 
depending on confidence in analysis and 
previous designs 
Series of tests to expose mechanism to  
ultimate design loads and worst conditions 
expected in service; tests are usually run 
consecutively and, depending on the mission, 
consist of static loading, vibration, shock, 
thermal, vacuum, or humidity precondi- 
tioning to operation 
Suspension or zero-g simulation with mass 
and inertia models of separating bodies; flight 
hardware for separation mechanism ; actual 
ordnance; wind-tunnel tests if separation is to 
occur in atmosphere; fit check performed 
early in test program to verify satisfactory 
interface 
Firings under actual conditions to determine 
no-fire and all-fire characteristics (details in 
ref. 243 
Short series of vibration and thermal tests, 
usually low test levels 
Firings of selected samples from lot to deter- 
mine no-fire and all-fire characteristics (details 
in ref. 24) 
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